Assessing the commensurability of theories of consciousness: On the usefulness of common denominators in differentiating, integrating and testing hypotheses

K. Evers, M. Farisco, C. M. A. Pennartz
Consciousness and Cognition 119 (2024) 103668

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103668

How deep is the current diversity in the panoply of theories to define consciousness, and to what extent do they share common denominators?
We posit logical (and, when applicable, empirical) commensurability as a necessary condition for identifying common denominators among different theories and propose dimensions for inclusion in a set of logically and empirically commensurable theories of consciousness. We suggest a methodology of comparing different theories via multiple probing questions, allowing to discern overall (dis)similarities between theories.

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